In this paper, we will present the firm's knowledge base function and introduce an optimisation problem where the firm seeks to maximise its profits with scarce knowledge assets. In this, it has to share its knowledge assets between activities that help to increase the firm's knowledge base and activities that are needed to protect and exploit the knowledge. In addition to these choices, the firm meets a question of whether and how to use partnerships when trying to maximise profits based on the knowledge assets that can be more or less protected. We will present the evolutionarily inspired optimisation problems as perspectives of one company, two companies and three companies and introduce the differential evolution algorithm as a solution to the optimisation problems. Our simulation results show that by proper optimisation of resource allocations, a company can achieve a sustainable advantage compared with other companies.
Introduction
In this paper, we will present the firm's knowledge base function and introduce an optimisation problem, in which the firm seeks to maximise its profits with its scarce knowledge assets. In this, it has to share its knowledge resources between activities that help to increase the firm's knowledge base and activities that are needed to protect and exploit the existing value creating knowledge base. In addition to these choices, the firm meets a question of whether and how to use partnerships when trying to maximise profits based on the knowledge. We will present these optimisation problems from the perspectives of one company, two companies and three companies and introduce a differential evolution algorithm-based solution to the optimisation problems. Our simulation results show that by proper optimisation of knowledge assets, a company can achieve competitive advantage compared with its rivals.
Posing the issue
Recently, we have witnessed a rapid rise of partnerships and fusions within the knowledge intensive high tech industries, especially in the pharmaceuticals, reflecting the important role of science-based technological knowledge (more about this, see Kyläheiko, 2013; Teece, 1998; Yeoh and Roth, 1999) . The more profits are based on new knowledge-based innovations, the more important it is to be able to gather knowledge from a large pool. Here is, of course, an incentive to network (on theoretical premises, see Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000; Jarillo, 1988; Kogut, 1988 Kogut, , 2000 . On the other hand, the cumulative growth of scientific knowledge has also produced the need for higher specification and even dispersion of partly tacit bits of knowledge (Hayek, 1945; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011) . In addition, deep going specialisation and improved but extremely expensive research technologies have drastically increased the R&D costs.
Some researchers also speak about declining technological opportunities, especially in the pharmaceutical industry (Light and Lexchin, 2012; Orsenigo et al., 2001 ). As Kyläheiko et al. (2013, p.182) conclude: 'the best way to coordinate these rapidly increasing but expensive and disperse partly tacit bits knowledge is establishing strategic research networks that make it possible to profit from larger knowledge pool through common learning and shared capabilities' (see also Kale et al., 2000) . In this paper, we will look at different technology strategies of high-tech companies when trying to optimise their knowledge-based profits by focusing either on the offensive strategy, i.e., generating new innovations (original drugs in the pharmaceuticals) and trying to minimise the risks and high costs by networking or on the so-called defensive strategy based on the imitation (generics in the pharmaceutical industries, see Kyläheiko et al., 2011 Kyläheiko et al., , 2012 Kyläheiko et al., , 2013 .
In this paper, we will especially analyse the profitability of establishing a research network. The firm's knowledge base has a crucial role for the survival and competitiveness of the firms in modern economy (Teece, 2000 (Teece, , 2006 , especially in innovative-intensive high-tech sectors. In addition to the own internal learning through expensive R&D investments, the firms need the ability to identify relevant external knowledge sources and to utilise large knowledge pool in their innovation activities. When building their knowledge-base, the firms combine knowledge components originated from different sources (Colombelli et al., 2013) . When the firms aim to utilise their knowledge-base and profit from knowledge-based assets, in addition to the choices related to knowledge sourcing and building absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , they also have to solve issues related to such decisions how to effectively protect their knowledge assets, how to best utilise complementary knowledge-based assets that are controlled by other companies and when and how to share knowledge with partners. When aiming to exploit their knowledge, the firms meet the question to what extent to codify the knowledge (Cowan et al., 2000) and how efficient means the intellectual property rights are for protecting knowledge-based assets from imitation (Levin et al., 1987) . Hence, especially for the firms operating at the knowledge-intensive industries, the firm-level strategic investments into building, nurturing and utilising knowledge base are crucial decisions that effect to the long-term development and success of the firms.
Towards a knowledge-based model

The basic model to be optimised
In this study, following some basic ideas introduced earlier by Kyläheiko et al. (2011 Kyläheiko et al. ( , 2012 Kyläheiko et al. ( , 2013 ), we will model the firm's knowledge base as consisting of knowledge from different sources. In our model, the firm-specific absorptive capacity, knowledge tacitness and legal appropriability determine how well the firm can utilise its knowledge from different knowledge sources and further protect its knowledge base and profit from these bits of knowledge through innovations. Absorptive capacity denotes the firm's capacity to acquire knowledge and exploit it Levinthal, 1989, 1990) . Tacitness of knowledge refers to what extent the knowledge is tacit vs. codified and hence protectable. The more tacit the bits of knowledge are the easier they are to protect and the harder they are to share with partners. Also, legal appropriability (Teece, 1986) mechanisms, such as different types of intellectual property rights, e.g., patens and copy rights, can be used to protect firm's knowledge-based assets and innovations. What is new in this paper is the use of the differential evolutionary optimisation algorithm that allows us to optimise the use of different technology strategy instruments over time in one, two or three company optimisation cases. Instead of traditional innovation race models that often focus on the optimal use of only one instrument, normally the R&D investments, our approach makes it possible to the optimising firms to utilise different technology parameters, such as legal means to protect their knowledge assets, the tacitness level of their knowledge and the absorptive capacity needed for the utilisation of the knowledge assets that are generic (like science) or created by other firms.
Our study is organised as follows. We will first introduce the company's knowledge base function in its general form for an individual company i. Then, we will show how tacitness parameter, legal appropriability parameter and absorptive capacity parameter relate to this knowledge function formula, which will be introduced in the general n company universe. The next step is to demonstrate this in our three company case (two companies are potential partners both using an offensive strategy, whereas the third one uses a defensive imitating technology strategy) case. Next we will introduce an optimisation problem for a company i that invests its knowledge resources using its appropriability, tacitness, and absorptive capacity parameters. For a simplified non-time dependent static case we also show the optimal solution by using Lagrangian multipliers in Appendix B. In our simulation model, we will apply the optimisation for each time step as our simulation develops and in those simulations we also include stochasticity in the process by introducing randomness into basic components. This way we also bring dynamics from simulation into account and take into consideration how a possible optimisation strategy changes during time depending on the event that take place during the simulation and also take into account how other company's behaviour effects the process. This optimisation process is investigated not only from a single company perspective, but it is also extended to cover two companies that are considered to be in partnership together, two companies, which are not in partnership, and to three company case bringing us into a complex multi-objective optimisation problem with two and three company cases. Besides this we will also examine our optimisation problem from the simulation perspective by repeating this dynamic process and computing the mean results and examining the variance of this behaviour.
A company's knowledge base is assumed to consist from knowledge from the following coherent parts: accumulated knowledge, internally generated knowledge (e.g., through R&D), knowledge gained from the rival companies, knowledge gained from the partner companies and available scientific knowledge.
To model these into a single equation is a complex task and here we approach this situation from one company perspective and assume we can use this information by aggregating it using a totalling type of operator. This way company's knowledge base function can be written in general case for company i as 
Legal appropriability parameter; 0 ≤ β j ≤ 1, where β j = 0 means fully protected knowledge (e.g., an iron-clad patent) and β j = 1 means freely available knowledge γ: Absorptive capacity parameter; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, where γ = 0 means that the firm cannot absorb any bit of knowledge, whereas γ = 1 means that everything can be absorbed.
The firm can profit from knowledge assets only when the rivals cannot utilise it. Hence, the value creation function of knowledge (equation (2)) depends on the ability to appropriate it by means of tacitness and legal means as follows:
(1 )(1 )
where, α 3 = tacitness parameter controlled by the firm itself; 0 ≤ α 3 ≤ 1, where α 3 = 0 means that the firm's own knowledge base is fully tacit and α 3 = 1 means that it is fully codified.
β 2 = appropriability parameter based on legal means controlled by the firm itself. 0 ≤ β 2 ≤ 1, where β 2 = 0 means legally fully protected piece of knowledge (e.g., an iron-clad patent) and β 2 = 1 means unprotected knowledge.
Putting equations (1) and (2) together we get an accumulated knowledge base for the next time step as follows: whereas the bits of knowledge gained from the partner companies is modelled using 2 .
Also we have 1 , 1 , 2 , 2 ,
where index set k consists of all the indexes of the companies, which are in the partnership with the company i. Basically, the universe what we are considering consists of the company itself, rival companies and partner companies. We assume that in the company's knowledge base there exists four different knowledge generating functions, which we will next go through more thoroughly from the company i perspective. i t A is the company i's R&D-based knowledge generated internally within the firm at the period t. i t B is understood as pieces of knowledge that can be exploited from the knowledge possessed by rival companies at the period t. This information is assumed to be consisting of the rival companies .
t A This means that total amount of knowledge that theoretically can be exploited can be computed as
where index set k consists of all the indexes of the companies, which are in the partnership with the company i and hence are not considered as rivals of company i, and n is total number of companies involved in the given universe. (See Kyläheiko et al. (2012) for more information about this assumption.) This assumption results in the fact that the company i's 'gain' from rival companies can be then modelled as follows:
C is knowledge possessed by the network of partners at the period t. This network consists of the companies, which are now in the index set k and they are supposed to consist of the knowledge base generated in A t for each company. Total amount of knowledge i t C possessed by the network can now be computed as follows:
And, respectively, the gain obtained from partner companies for company i can be modelled as follows:
i t D is generic scientific knowledge available at the period t. This information is considered to be available to all the companies depending on their absorptive capacity.
Besides the above mentioned assumptions we will also assume that the knowledge bases These functions where first introduced to knowledge base equation in Kyläheiko et al. (2011) where they were also explained in further detail. In addition, we assume (as can be seen in equation (1)) that all the given parameters are company specific meaning that company i can affect the values of parameters α i , β i and γ i , i.e., the company can use these parameters as technology strategy instruments when maximising its profit. In fact, the parameter γ i could further be divided into three sub-parameters, if we want to specify them w.r.t. B ti , C ti and D ti . Here, α i is the tacitness parameter controlled by the company itself, β i is the legal appropriability parameter, and γ i describes absorptive capacity of the company i, which can be consider to be the company level absorptive capacity or it can be divided w.r.t. B ti , C ti and D ti .
To be able to analyse the profits generated from knowledge assets-based gains we also have to consider the costs of making these gains happen. For our purposes, we simply decided to apply a simple totalling type of operator, in which individual costs arising from individual knowledge gains are summed together. This gives us an equation for total costs as follows:
Cost c c c c
The cost coefficients , , c denote the costs of acquiring the knowledge from different knowledge sources. In our computations, we assumed all individual cost coefficients to be simply constants.
Next we will turn our attention into modelling the patent applications used by offensive firms and the ways how they affect their knowledge gains. We consider that the probability that patent goes through does not only depend on random occurrences happening in the company, which cannot explained, but it also depends on the R&D efforts put in when investing in the internal knowledge base A t . These two issues lead us to model the patent information so that instead of just using uniformly distributed random number U(0, 1) on the unit interval we will take the amount of R&D invested in A t also into the account by considering the costs of A t at the time step t as follows:
where λ is the threshold level, which needs to be achieved in order for a patent to get accepted and n is the total number of time steps applied in simulations. This is then added to the A t as follows: ,
in which one can control the effect of the knowledge increase that occurs when a patent is established by means of the constant ϕ. In our computations, we will simply set ϕ = 1. This way we manage to get the effect that when the amount of an R&D effort put into A t increases also the chances to get the patent application accepted increases.
A solution for the one company optimisation case
Now we are ready to determine the knowledge-based profit maximising solution by introducing first the profit equation for the company i. The profit equation at period t can be expressed in terms of the value of the knowledge base of the company and the cost of creating/acquiring the knowledge needed simply as follows:
where ( ) For each time step t
where
Cost
In this optimisation problem, we assume that the company i has knowledge resources worth of k 0 to invest in time step t which introduces our first constraint. Besides this, we assume that parameter values cannot be negative as denoted in second constraint with the lower boundary and also that parameter itself cannot generate new knowledge, which sets the upper boundary to one.
To take this into a more concrete level we next consider following situation. Our universe consist of three companies from which first two have formed a partnership together and third one is considered a rival company. Also we assume that company 1 follows the optimisation strategy, whereas for others investments in parameters α i , β i and γ i are evenly distributed. Also we assume k 0 < 3 so that we can eliminate the case of setting all parameter to be simply one 
and the cost function is as follows:
Besides this, for other companies we assume to have (1 - (1
with the assumption that for the company 3 k 0 is evenly distributed for each company parameter, i.e., it is not optimising their values. In this particular optimisation case besides optimising the parameter values for each time step also following values would be calculated 
A solution for the three company optimisation case
In the three company case where the two offensive companies are in the partnership we will use the following formulation:
where 
To solve these complex optimisation problems we decided to use the differential evolution (DE) algorithm (Price et al., 2005) that makes it possible to dynamically trace the paths followed by each company. In the next section, we will in detail go through, how the DE algorithm operates and what needs to be taken into consideration when considering our optimisation problems.
Differential evolution algorithm in solving the introduced optimisation problem
The traditional non-linear optimisation algorithms are working with a single candidate solution vector. Typically they start with a randomly generated trial solution, and then attempt to improve that solution so, that the objective function value is decreasing. For that purpose the algorithm is generating new trial solutions with an algorithm specific method from and iteration to another, as far as the algorithm specific stopping condition is reached. If the new trial improves the solution, then it will substitute the old one, otherwise it will be abandoned. At the end of the search process the current solution, which is also the best found solution providing the lowest objective function value, is the solution to the optimisation problem at hand. The DE algorithm (Price et al., 2005; Storn and Price, 1997) was introduced by Storn and Price (1997) and it belongs to the family of evolutionary algorithms (EAs). It can be characterised as a global optimiser over continuous parameter spaces. In comparison with the traditional optimisation approaches, the EAs are working with multiple candidate solution vectors in parallel. In particular, they are working with a population of solutions. The population contains a predefined fixed number of individuals. Each individual is a complete candidate solution for the optimisation problem, in our model a vector containing values for all the parameters 1 1 1 , , α β γ (or 1 1 1 2 2 2 , , , , , α β γ α β γ in the two company optimisation problem). Therefore, the dimensionality of the optimisation problem to be solved is D = N, where N is the number of parameters. This means that the individuals of the population, the candidate solutions, are D-dimensional vectors. The initial population of individuals or the population of first generation is typically generated randomly. After that the algorithm starts creating the population of the next generation by mimicking the processes of evolution in nature. First, using crossover and mutation operations, a temporary population of trial solutions is created on the basis of the current generation's population. Then each new trial solution will be evaluated by the objective function, which is in our case the profit function. If an individual of the trial population provides a better objective function value than the corresponding member of the current population, then it will replace the current population member and survive into the next generation. Otherwise it will be discarded. The process is repeated generation by generation for all members of the population. Typically the stopping criterion is the number of generation's to be computed. The final solution to the problem is the best individual of the very last generations population, i.e., the one providing the lowest objective function value. This individual is to be used as the solution to the optimisation problem at hand.
The evolutionary algorithm described above is based on the evolutionary process in an artificial ecosystem in a memory of a computer. The basic idea of all the evolutionary algorithms is similar. However, the implementation of the details varies a lot from an algorithm to another. Some relevant particular details of the implementation of the DE algorithm will be further discussed. The design principles of DE are simplicity, efficiency, and the use of floating-point encoding for representing the individual solutions vectors in the population instead of representing them internally for example by binary numbers. In our case it means that the external representation of the solution is similar to the representation that the algorithm is using internally. This is convenient since no data type conversions from external to internal representation, or vice versa, is needed, because both are sharing the same encoding. A more thorough description of the optimisation process will be given in Appendix A.
Results
Simulation results for one company optimisation case
In the first optimisation case we are considering the three company case, in which two offensive companies are in the partnership and the imitative one is not. To get a fair comparison with the cases in which only one company is optimising its technology strategy parameters and the others are not, we will first run this simulation case without any optimisation. These basic results can be seen in Figure 1 .
As can be seen from Figure 1 first the profits for the imitating company 3 (π 3 ) are higher owing to lower R&D investments costs, but eventually a partnership is creating a larger knowledge pool for the offensive companies 1 and 2 and, hence, also their profits grow higher than the profits of company 3.
In the next simulation, we will apply the parameter optimisation for the company 1 following the rules of the optimisation problem introduced in equation (11) to see how this will affect the levels of the knowledge bases and profits of each companies. It is interesting to compare these results with the result obtained in Figure 1 in which no technology strategy parameter optimisation procedure is followed.
As can be clearly seen from Figures 2 and 3 the optimal technology strategy parameter values for the optimising firm one can be found in the current simulation case (where the sum of the parameter values is fixed at the level k 0 = 2.5 instead of the maximum value 3.0) from the parameter combination, where the company one's knowledge base will be strongly protected by having very low α 1 , β 1 values and the company is also able to effectively absorb lots of generic and rivals' knowledge through a high absorption capacity parameter value γ 1 . In this setting the optimising company 1 has first to allocate its scarce resources to increase its absorption capacity to effectively utilise the knowledge created by the partner company 2. However, the higher the company one's knowledge base grows the more important it becomes to be able to protect its knowledge assets, i.e., the company 1 puts extra efforts to increase the tacitness (which decreases the partner company two's ability to profit from the knowledge base of the company 1) and to use legal means like patents to protect its knowledge base against the imitating company 3. At this stage (after three runs or so) only what is left after putting the parameter values α 1 , β 1 at the zero level will be used to improve absorption capacity. It is clearly of the secondary importance. This two stage "first increase absorptive capacity, then focus on tacitness and patents" technology strategy can clearly outperform the strategies of the others as can be seen in Figure 2 . There are, of course, differences in high-tech industries as for allocating resources in different technology strategy instruments. In the pharmaceuticals investments in iron clad patents are of very high importance, whereas in the ICT sector the role of tacitness and cross-licensing and patent pools between partners and even between rivals are of greater importance, since it is not possible to have any iron clad patents in this eco system. 
Simulation results in case in which also patent-related uncertainty and extra costs are considered (three company model)
In our next simulation case we will make the same assumptions as previously, with the difference that now we will assume that the two offensive, i.e., innovating companies, which are in the partnership together, invest heavily in patents and the third company will not be investing in patents at all, i.e., it only imitates. For more information on how patents are implemented into our model, see equation (10), (see also Kyläheiko et al. (2013) as for the first ideas for modelling patents and uncertainty in the knowledge base formulation). As to the costs, we will now assume a bit higher costs (C At and C Ct ) for innovating companies 1 and 2, since they have to cover both the partnership, risky R&D investments and patent application costs. By means of these new simulation runs we start to investigate how the level of the sum of parameter values, k 0, affects the simulation results. The optimisation model used is our first optimisation problem as explicated in equation (11). The optimal parameter values used for different sum values k 0 can be found in Figure 4 . As can clearly be seen from Figure 4 during this simulation exercise the optimum strategy is changing a bit and converging to the situation where α 1 and β 1 are zeros at the end. This is owing to the fact that as the company's knowledge base grows it becomes all the time more important to be able to protect it as well, if this is possible. This is why at the later time steps of simulation runs, only the rest what is left from k 0 will be invested in γ 1 . This can be seen from the results. In the first simulation where k 0 = 2.25 the optimal parameter values are (1 -α 1 ) = 0, (1 -β 1 ) = 0, γ 1 = 0.25 but when in the third simulation k 0 = 2.75, the optimal parameter values are now (1 -α 1 ) = 0, (1 -β 1 ) = 0, γ 1 = 0.75, i.e., γ 1 is the flexible parameter. In the beginning part of the simulation it seemed to be reasonable to invest to γ 1 to gain maximum growth potential for the knowledge base by using higher absorptive capacity, but as the knowledge base grew it became more and more important to protect its value through tacitness and patents and therefore less resources where available for increasing absorptive capacity. In Figure 5 , one can see individual simulation runs when k 0 was varied. What can be basically seen from the figures is that company 1 for which the parameters were optimised managed eventually to gain best profits. As it is clear that simulation process is stochastic owing to our assumption that patents are gained at random time point we also run the simulation optimisation process through 100 times and computed the statistics from it. This was done for the case k 0 = 2.75. In Figure 6 , we can see the histograms from the end results of the profit functions at last time step.
As one can see from the histogram results in Figure 6 even though company 2 can in some single simulation case even beat company 1 if it manages to get the patent protection clearly earlier than company 1, in general the results are clearly speaking in favour of company 1, i.e., the parameter optimising firm. When we compare mean values of companies 1 and 2 they show statistically significant difference at the 0.9999 confidence level. In Table 1 one can see the mean profit values, knowledge values and variances from this experiment. 
Simulation results for two company optimisation case
In this case, we will solve the second optimisation problem by using equation (9) in our simulations. Here the main difference from the previous simulation is that now we have two innovating companies, which are both simultaneously optimising their technology strategy parameters (company 1 and 2) to improve their performance. The imitating company 3 is assumed to have parameter values equally distributed as in previous cases.
In Figure 7 , we can again see the results from the parameter optimisation with different k 0 values for companies 1 and 2. As can be seen from the figures in both cases it seems to be reasonable to first invest in absorptive capacity, even with the risk that one cannot fully protect the knowledge base. Later on when the knowledge base grows enough protecting it becomes more and more important and therefore the companies only invest in absorptive capacity the amount what is left after first protecting the knowledge base. From profit simulations in Figure 8 we can clearly see that optimising the technology parameters clearly improves the profits of optimising companies, whereas the nonoptimising company 3 is clearly having troubles with its profit function.
As it is clear that simulation process is stochastic owing to our assumption that patents are gained at random time point we also run the simulation optimisation process through 100 times and computed the statistics from it. This was done for the case k 0 = 2.5. In Figure 9 , we can see the profit histograms from the end results at last time step. In Table 2 , the mean profit and knowledge base values are computed for three companies. When we now compare the mean values of the optimising companies 1 and 2 they do not show any statistically significant difference. The second simulation related to the case in which we now optimised the technology parameters of companies 1 (offensive, innovative) and 3 (defensive, imitative). This case clearly showed the great advantage of concentrating on optimising the company's parameters vs. concentrating only on patents or/and partnerships as the non-optimising company 2 does. Table 2 Mean and variances computed from 100 simulation runs for the profit functions and the knowledge bases for three companies. Two company optimisation case when optimisation is done for companies 1 and 2 20.89 0.004
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Figure 9
Histograms of the profit function values at the last time step for 100 simulations.
On the x-axis we have profit values at the end of simulation and on the y-axis number of hits on particular profit interval from 100 simulations, also (a) π 1 for company 1; (b) π 2 for company 2 and (c) π 3 for company 3. Two company optimisation case when optimisation is done for companies 1 and 2 (see online version for colours)
Profit simulations in Figure 10 also clearly show that the optimisation of all the three technology strategy parameters is much more important from the company's perspective than focusing on patents solely. In Figure 10 , we can see how the companies 1 and 3, which focused on parameter optimisation clearly outperformed the non-optimising company 2. This model also shows that since company 1 concentrated on both patents and technology parameter optimisation it clearly came out as a winning combination. The imitating company 3 also outperformed the non-optimising company 2 even though it did not invest in patents, whereas company 2 did. The message is clear; it is advisable for the companies to optimally use all their technology strategy parameters instead of just focusing on new innovations and patents. Figure 10 Profit simulation with k = 2.5 when companies one (blue) and three (green) are optimising their parameters (see online version for colours) Table 3 Mean and variances computed from 100 simulation runs for the profit functions and the knowledge bases for three companies. Two company optimisation case when optimisation is done for companies 1 and 3 As can be seen from Figure 11 and Table 3 focusing on technology strategy parameter optimisation is clearly more profitable in this case than focusing on new innovations and patents. Company 1 has clearly highest mean profit values, whereas the nonoptimising company 2 did clearly worst. Company 3 is now in the middle of company ranking, since it was optimising the parameters, but not concentrating on new innovations and patent-based gains.
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Simulation results for three company optimisation case
In our last simulation case, we will assume that all the three companies are optimising their technology strategy parameters. Here, we also repeated the 100 stochastic simulation cases to see how the profit functions would behave for each company. This was done with the same parameter k 0 = 2.5 value as in the previous case for the sake of comparison. In Figure 12 , one can see the histograms for the three companies.
The main results of the three company case have been summarised in Table 4 .
Figure 11
On the x-axis we have profit values at the end of simulation and on the y-axis number of hits on particular profit interval from 100 simulations, also (a) π 1 for company 1; (b) π 2 for company 2 and (c) π 3 for company 3. Two company optimisation case when optimisation is done for companies 1 and 3 (see online version for colours)
In Table 4 , the mean profit and knowledge base values are computed for three optimising companies. When we compare the mean values of innovative companies 1 and 2 they again show no statistically significant difference. 
Figure 12
On the x-axis we have profit values at the end of simulation and on the y-axis number of hits on particular profit interval from 100 simulations, also (a) π 1 for company 1; (b) π 2 for company 2 and (c) π 3 for company 3. Three company optimisation case (see online version for colours)
One important implication concerning the case where all the three companies are optimising their parameters compared with the previous two company cases is that now the imitating company 3 is improving its competitive advantage and this is, of course, occurring at the expense of innovating companies 1 and 2. Not so surprisingly, the variances are also higher in all companies owing to third company's different strategy.
From the optimal technology strategy parameter behaviour we can recognise the similar behaviour as in the previous cases. First, it seems to be reasonable to first invest in absorptive capacity even at the risk that one cannot then fully protect the knowledge base. However, later when the knowledge base has grown enough protecting it becomes more important and hence companies can invest in absorptive capacity only the amount what is left after first protecting the knowledge base by tacitness and legal means. When doing the appropriability regime tight enough the innovating companies 1 and 2 are able at least partly to hinder the imitation efforts of company 3. Hence, in this kind of a perfect information-based optimal world the imitation strategy does not seem to be a good idea, if all the companies are following the optimising strategy. Here we would also like to point out that this outcome is occurring in our 'perfect' information simulation world that consists only of three companies each one acting in an optimal way. This does not mean that this reasoning would work in the real world where the firms cannot clearly anticipate future outcomes and strategic manoeuvres of rivals.
Discussion
In this paper, we have launched and solved an optimisation problem relating to the issue of how to profit from knowledge assets in high-tech industries by using technology parameters as instruments. The knowledge base value maximisation problem transforms into an optimisation problem when we make the assumption that a company cannot invest in developing all its technology parameters without any limits but it has only scarce resources for that purpose. Therefore, the company has to make choices between investing either in tacitness, legal appropriability or absorptive capacity. Because it is impossible to invest in all immediately a compromise solution has to be found. This creates an optimisation problem in which the proper amount of resources has to be allocated to these three purposes.
To solve this complex dynamic optimisation problem we have applied the differential evolution algorithm for both one single company and mutliple companies. Our optimisation results show that through proper allocation of its technology parameter resources a company can really achieve a competitive advantage compared to its rivals. We first showed that it is generally a better option to invest in innovating than in imitating technology strategies. This conclusion especially holds true when all the firms are optimising instead of just following some rules of thumb. In addition, we showed that for an innovating firm the best strategy is to first invest in absorptive capacity to be able to extensively utilise the knowledge pool available. Relating to this it is also highly advisable to network with other innovating firms to even extend the knowledge pool. Interestingly, however, later when the knowledge is growing larger it is optimal to try to protect it by investing in legal appropriability means, such as patents, trademarks, and copy rights, and also in tacitness. Therefore, even less resources could be allocated to improving absorptive capacity.
For future research this model is planned to be extended to cover more companies and more technology strategy parameters. Also the differences between industries have to be taken into account in a more exact way. There also exist several multi-objective optimisation schemes, which are planned to be addressed. In the future, we also plan to take the cost allocation scheme into account in a more detailed way under the optimisation instead of just assuming them to be constant as in the current optimisation problems.
In each generation G, DE goes through each individual of the current population, each D dimensional candidate solution vector, v i,G , and creates the corresponding new trial vector u i,G , to compete with the current population member. In the most common DE version, DE/rand/1/bin (Price, 1999) , which is applied here, the trial solution vectors are generated with crossover and mutation operations as follows:
{1,2, , } r r r NP ∈ … (randomly selected, except mutual different and different from i)
The purpose of the above defined crossover and mutation operations is to generate new trial solutions that will compete about their survival with the current population members. In this particular DE version, NP must be at least four and it remains fixed along with CR and F during the whole execution of the algorithm. Parameter CR ∈ [0, 1], which controls the crossover operation, represents the probability that an element for the trial vector is chosen from a linear combination of three randomly chosen members of the population and not from the old vector v i,G . The condition j = j rand is to make sure that at least one element is different compared to the elements of the old vector. The parameter F is a scaling factor for mutations and its value is typically (0, 1+]. In practise, CR controls the rotational invariance of the search, and its small value (e.g., 0.1) is practicable with separable problems while larger values (e.g., 0.9) are for non-separable problems. The control parameter F controls the speed and robustness of the search, i.e., a lower value for F increases the convergence rate but may also result in a premature convergence to a local optimum. Parameters CR and NP have the same kind of effect on the convergence rate as F has. After the mutation and crossover operations, each trial vector u i,G , is compared to the corresponding member (individual) of the current population v i,G ,. If the trial vector has an equal or better objective value, then it replaces the old vector in the next generation. This can be presented as follows (in this paper minimisation of objectives is assumed) (Price, 1999) :
DE is an elitist method, since the best population member is always preserved and the average objective value of the population will never get worse. Thus, there is no possibility that the algorithm starts to diverge, and the following generation's population would contain worse solutions than the previous generation's population.
In our case the control parameters of DE algorithm were set as follows: CR = 0.9 and F = 0.5 were applied for all simulation optimisation problems. NP was chosen so that it was six times the size of the optimised parameters. G max was chosen as G max = 200. These selections were based on general recommendations in the literature (Lampinen and Zelinka, 2000; Liu and Lampinen, 2002; Price et al., 2005; Zaharie, 2002) and practical experiences with the usage of DE. No systematic investigations were performed for finding the optimal control parameter values, therefore further performance improvements by finding better control parameter settings in future are within possibilities. While the applied control parameter settings were found appropriately effective and generally applicable for all tested cases, there is no guarantee that they are the most effective ones.
Comparing to other evolutionary algorithms, choosing the values for the control parameters of DE is not particularly difficult. Typically, the initial guess for the control parameter values is performed following the recommendations in the literature (e.g., Lampinen and Zelinka, 2000; Price et al., 2005) . After that usually a few trial optimisation runs is performed for fine-tuning the control parameters. This is also typical practise in applying evolutionary algorithms to a new problem; initial values are first chosen based on the available problem-specific knowledge and algorithm-specific recommendations. Then a few trials are performed for fine-tuning the control parameters. DE is not known to be particularly sensitive to it's control parameters. Especially if the problem at hand can be viewed as an instance from a generic class of problems, the same control parameters are effective within that class of problems. In our case, the classifier model subject to optimisation can be viewed as a generic class of problems. Only the training data is changing from a case to another requiring the classifier model only to be scaled correspondingly.
Appendix B: Lagrangian multiplier solution for static optimisation problem
Here we will show a standard static optimisation problem and its solution for the maximisation of the knowledge-based profit from the perspective of a single firm i. Following our idea to maximise the knowledge-based value we can start from the knowledge function as follows (compare with our earlier equation (1) As firm i has no control over the variables of the other firms, they are treated as parameters and we can define is generally the more restrictive one. Here we can see that in the static case it is optimal to maximise the knowledge protection by putting the parameter values of tacitness and appropriability at the level zero and leave all the rest resources for the improvements of absorptive capacity. As our dynamic evolutionary optimisation shows, however, this results does not hold in the dynamic set up, even if it tells us something about the behaviour in theoretical static environment in the long run. However, real economic systems are subject to continuous environmental shocks and changes and will never converge to any long run equilibrium, hence the dynamic short run behaviour as derived above is of much more importance.
